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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Automated traffic enforcement schemes, employing speed and 
red light cameras,1 are increasingly used by local governments in 
the United States.2  These are not to be confused with red light 
programs that are aimed at prostitution rather than bad driving.3  In 
some schemes, traffic violations are pursued against the owners as 
well as the drivers of the recorded motor vehicles.  Here, the mens 
rea requirements that typically accompany criminal code 
violations are lacking.  A form of strict liability for ‘secondary 
culprits,’ those owning the vehicles, is justified because of their 
ability to control the ‘primary culprits,’ those using the vehicles, 
and because traffic accidents and their resulting injuries will be 
* Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law; Visiting Professor, The 
John Marshall Law School, 2010–2011.  Special thanks to Professor Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Margo Ely, and Zachary Townsend for their comments and to Ed Laube for his comments and 
terrific research assistance. 
1. Robin Miller, Annotation, Automated Traffic Enforcement Systems, 26 A.L.R. 6TH 
179, §2 (2007) (distinguishing speed cameras, operative since the early twentieth century to 
enforce speed limits, and red light cameras, operative since 1994 to enforce traffic signal 
rules).  See also Kevin P. Shannon, Speeding Toward Disaster: How Cleveland’s Traffic 
Cameras Violate the Ohio Constitution, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 610–14 (2007). 
2. Highway Loss Data Institute, Communities Using Red Light and/or Speed Cameras, 
INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, 
http://www.iihs.org/research/topics/auto_enforce_cities.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (as of 
January 2010, speed cameras were used in 12 states by 52 communities and red light cameras 
were used in 25 states and the District of Columbia by over 439 communities).  See also Fran 
Spielman, Red-light Cameras Yield, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Oct. 26, 2009, available at 
http://www.suntimes.com/news/cityhall/1845842,CST-NWS-redlight26.article (189 red-light 
cameras in use at the end of 2009 in Chicago).  Plans to have 330 red-light cameras in place by 
2012 have been shelved chiefly because of the city’s “worst budget crisis in modern history.”  
Id. 
3. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 457 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(describing Michigan’s “red light abatement” prescription in a case involving sex in a car with 
a prostitute). 
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reduced.  Some empirical studies have demonstrated that reduced 
accidents follow implementation of automated traffic enforcement 
schemes aimed at drivers who speed and run red lights.4
While likely to continue to anger many citizens,5 the surge of 
automated traffic enforcement schemes will also likely continue 
since significant deterrence of vehicle violations may follow and 
significant additional revenue for local governments will follow.6  
As well, many violations charged through automated schemes can 
be processed administratively outside the judicial article courts,7 
freeing traditional trial court judges to handle the pressing business 
of civil and criminal cases8 and freeing prosecutors to focus on 
more serious offenses.9  Increasing numbers of secondary culprits 
will be fined for the driving of others whose bad acts were never 
aided nor condoned, and may even have been strongly discouraged 
or expressly banned. 
4. See Carie A. Torrence, Click!  A Snapshot of Automated Traffic Enforcement Issues, 
50 MUN. LAW. 14, 14–15 (July/Aug. 2009).  But see Erika Slife & Bob Secter, Red-light 
Cameras: First 14 Installed in Suburbs Show Mixed Results, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 18, 
2009, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-12-18/news/chi-red-light-cameras-
suburbs-18dec18_1_red-light-cameras-tickets-for-red-light-violators-idot-records-showed-
collisions. 
5. Torrence, supra note 4, at 16–17 (describing the “public outcry in some communities” 
over local government use of automated traffic enforcement systems). 
6. See, e.g., Jason George & Graydon Megan, Red-light Cameras in Schaumburg 
Screech to a Halt, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-red-light-camerasjul15,0,7535797.story (red 
light camera netted more than $1 million, but the program was ended after data showed no 
reduction in accidents and local shoppers threatened to take their business elsewhere); Bob 
Secter & Jason George, Red-light Cameras Raking in Cash, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 12, 2009, 
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-07-12/news/0907110254_1_red-light-
cameras-camera-tickets-suburbs (first red-light camera in Bellwood, Illinois “became a cash 
machine,” generating $60,000 to $70,000 a month); Schwarzenegger Wants Red-light 
Cameras to Terminate Speeding, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 2010, 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/driveon/post/2010/01/schwarzenegger-wants-red-
light-cameras-to-terminate-speeding/1 (“Los Angeles saw its revenue double to $400,000 a 
month from cameras at just 32 intersections.”) [hereinafter Schwarzenegger]. 
7. For smaller local governments, interlocal agreements could allow some communities 
to utilize the preexisting ordinance violation bureaus of adjacent communities.  See, e.g., H.B. 
1186, 116th Gen. Assemb. (Ind. 2010). 
8. Cf., Editorial, State Courts at the Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, at A30 
(budget cuts and other budget woes are impeding “core court functions”). 
9. Cf., Henry K. Lee, Many Contra Costa Crooks Won’t Be Prosecuted, SF GATE, Apr. 
22, 2009, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-22/bay-area/17194086_1_prosecute-
deputy-district-contra-costa-county (county’s district attorney will no longer prosecute many 
misdemeanors, as assaults, thefts burglaries, vandalism, trespass and shoplifting, because of a 
budget deficit). 
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There are limits to local governmental regulation of traffic 
violations involving secondary culprits.  Besides public outcry, 
there are state and federal government preemptions as well as state 
and federal constitutional interests.  The constitutional bars include 
interests in equal protection, non-excessive fines, and due process. 
Notwithstanding these limits, there is much room for 
expanding automated traffic enforcement schemes aimed at 
secondary culprits.  Judicial precedents, to be reviewed shortly, 
suggest that there can be expansions of non-automated traffic 
enforcement schemes, as well as non-traffic enforcement schemes 
aimed at secondary culprits involved with such matters as trash, 
alcohol, and drugs.  Those seeking greater deterrence of 
undesirable acts and additional non-tax revenues will pursue such 
expansions. 
This paper will first review contemporary local regulations of 
secondary culprits through automated traffic enforcement schemes, 
focusing on speeding, bad turn, and red light violations.  It will 
then examine the limits on such regulations, focusing on recent 
federal court decisions sustaining automated local enforcement 
schemes challenged on preemption and constitutional grounds.  
Finally, it will explore potential new local governmental 
regulations of secondary culprits in and outside of traffic settings 
and with and without automated enforcement. 
II.  AUTOMATED TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT SCHEMES AIMED AT 
SECONDARY CULPRITS 
Today there are many automated traffic enforcement schemes 
aimed at secondary culprits involving red lights.  These schemes 
have been unsuccessfully challenged in court, as will be 
demonstrated.  The challenged provisions are next reviewed, 
followed by an examination of the judicial precedents. 
In Knoxville, Tennessee, there is “an ordinance regulating 
motorists approaching or at a red light.”10  The Knoxville City 
Code states: 
Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering 
the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then 
before entering the intersection, and shall remain standing until 
green or “go” is shown alone; provided, however, that a right turn 
10. City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
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on a red signal shall be permitted at all intersections within the city 
provided that the prospective turning car comes to a full and 
complete stop before turning and that the turning car shall yield the 
right-of-way to pedestrians and cross traffic traveling in 
accordance with their traffic signal.  However, such turn will not 
endanger other traffic lawfully using the intersection.11
One of the methods utilized by Knoxville to enforce the code 
involves a “red light enforcement program” which involves 
photographing vehicles running red lights at certain intersections.12  
Violators are subject to a “civil penalty of $50, without assessment 
of court costs or fees.”13 Violators include the owners of the motor 
vehicles that prompted citations for violations observed in the red 
light enforcement program.14  Yet an owner can escape 
responsibility if on the designated court date, the owner furnishes 
to the city court “the name and address of the person or entity who 
leased, rented, or otherwise had care, custody, and control of the 
vehicle at the time of the violation” or swears “the vehicle 
involved was stolen or was in the care, custody, or control of some 
person who did not have his permission to use the vehicle.”15  
Interestingly, in a similar enactment the Tennessee legislature does 
not allow owners to escape a comparable state law responsibility if 
the owner gives a name, the vehicle or plates were stolen, or the 
owner swears the vehicle at the relevant time was in the care, 
custody or control of a person without the owner’s permission.16
In Chicago, Illinois, a comparable automated traffic 
enforcement scheme operates for secondary culprits, though 
differently than in Knoxville.  That scheme involves “cameras at 
traffic intersections throughout Chicago” designed to photograph 
vehicles “that either enter an intersection against a red traffic light 
or make a turn in the face of a red light when turning is 
11. Id. (quoting KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. X, § 17-
506(a)(3) (Municode 2009)). 
12. Id. at 331. 
13. Id. at 334 (quoting KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. V, div. 1, 
§ 17-210(d)(1)). 
14. Id. at 333 (quoting KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. V, div. 1, 
§ 17-210(c)(3)). 
15. Id. at 333–34 (quoting KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. V, 
div. 1, § 17-210(c)(4)). 
16. Id. at 336 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-198). 
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prohibited.”17  The registered vehicle owner is liable for a $90 fine 
if a red light is run.18 Responsibility can be avoided, however, if 
the registered owner “is either a motor vehicle dealership or a 
manufacturer and has formally leased the car pursuant to a written 
lease agreement.”19  Responsibility is assigned to the lessee 
instead.20  As well, responsibility can be avoided if the vehicle or 
plates were stolen, or the vehicle was sold,21 or the signal was 
obscured, or the vehicle was yielding to an ambulance, or there is 
an otherwise valid defense under “state law.”22  Owner 
responsibility cannot be avoided in Chicago, as it can in Knoxville, 
“by establishing someone else was in control” of the vehicle “at 
the time of the violation.”23
In Chicago, unlike Knoxville, red light enforcement hearings 
are done administratively.  The Chicago Traffic Code 
“incorporates the City’s administrative scheme for parking 
violations.”24
Administrative hearings for red light and speeding violators 
also occur in Cleveland, Ohio,25 where the city uses “the parking 
violations bureau for the initial appeal of the notice of violation 
issued by the Clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court.”26  Fines 
can be $10027 or more.28  Adverse findings can be entered against 
17. Idris v. City of Chi. (Idris I), 06 C 6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 
2008) (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-020(a)), aff’d, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009). 
18. Id. (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-020(a)). 
19. Id. at *2 (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-020(a)(3)). 
20. Id. (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-020(a)(3)). 
21. Idris v. City of Chi. (Idris II), 552 F.3d 564, 565 (7th Cir. 2009). 
22. Id. at 567. 
23. City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); Id. at 339 
n.5 (“Unlike Knoxville’s ordinance, the ordinance for Chicago did not allow the vehicle’s 
owner to shift liability if the owner was able to prove he or she was not actually driving the 
vehicle.”). 
24. Idris I, 2008 WL 182248, at *9 (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-050).  This 
scheme is described in Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? 
On Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. 
REV. 1, 14–16 (2007).  The administrative scheme for adjudicating Chicago parking violations 
was established in 1990 and has been upheld when challenged under state and federal 
constitutional provisions.  Van Harken v. City of Chi., 713 N.E.2d 754 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) 
(state); Van Harken v. City of Chi., 103 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1997) (federal). 
25. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(a), (k) (FindLaw through June 30, 
2010). 
26. Gardner v. City of Cleveland, 656 F. Supp. 2d 751, 755 (recognizing enforcement 
occurs through Cleveland Codified Ordinance section 431.031). 
27. Id. at 758. 
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vehicle owners who were not, by way of defense, “driving at the 
time of the violation . . . .”29  However, as in Knoxville, vehicle 
owner liability can be avoided if someone else was driving, the 
owner names that person in an affidavit, and the alleged driver 
does not deny being the driver.30  Initial findings are made by “a 
Hearing Examiner in the City of Cleveland’s Parking Violations 
Bureau, Photo Safety Division . . . ,” whose decision can be 
appealed before “the Cuyahoga County Court of Common 
Pleas.”31
Thus, an automobile owner can be a secondary culprit within 
local traffic codes, incurring penalties based on an operator’s 
misconduct even when the owner was not directly involved.  In 
Chicago and Cleveland, administrative schemes are used to assess 
such penalties upon innocent but guilty owners.  However, there 
are limits on such local traffic laws. 
III.  LIMITS ON LOCAL TRAFFIC REGULATIONS OF SECONDARY 
CULPRITS 
To date, the courts have sustained the Knoxville, Chicago, and 
Cleveland regulations of secondary culprits through automated 
traffic enforcement schemes, while recognizing limits on possible 
expansion.  Challengers have raised concerns about both 
governmental structure/authorization and individual constitutional 
interests.32  The courts have suggested that certain future schemes 
28. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(o) (FindLaw) (speeding 25 mph or 
more over the speed limit or “any violation of a school or construction zone speed limit” incurs 
a $200 penalty). 
29. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 762. 
30. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(k) (FindLaw) (collection processes 
continue against the owner where the person named in the affidavit denies driving).  See also 
McCarthy v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:09-CV-1298, 2009 WL 2424296, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 
6, 2009) (lessees properly fined as they had an opportunity to appeal which they did not 
utilize).  By contrast, another Cleveland ordinance that allows vehicle forfeiture in a trial court 
when the vehicle is “used for the commission of a felony drug abuse offense” permits 
“innocent owners” defenses.  CLEVELAND, OHIO, OFFENSES AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES CODE 
§ 607.05(a), (e) (FindLaw through June 30, 2010). 
31. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2506 (LexisNexis 2010) 
gives the right for an administrative appeal). 
32. Critics of automated traffic enforcement schemes often have concerns extending 
beyond strict legal limits.  See, e.g., Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 
2008 WL 782540, at *4 & n.2 (E.D. Tenn. 2008); Id. at *4 n.2 (technological advances and 
local government pacts with private companies like Redflex “raise the Orwellian spectre of a 
future where traffic control is regulated by a corporate ‘Big Brother’”). 
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could fail on these grounds.  Existing legal limits will now be 
explored. 
A.  State Government Preemption 
State law can preempt local automated traffic enforcement 
schemes.  State laws will preclude certain traffic acts from local 
regulations where, for example, statewide uniformity is reasonably 
desired.33  In those states where this is true, local regulatory 
initiatives are forbidden no matter how reasonable.34  By contrast, 
local schemes, and resulting diversity in traffic laws across the 
state, can be facilitated by state lawmakers.  Certain traffic matters 
have been recognized by state legislators as needing local, rather 
than state, lawmaking.  Thus, typically both state and local 
lawmakers regulate traffic, sometimes even the same traffic acts.35
Illinois legislators expressly invite some local automated 
traffic enforcement schemes.  The Vehicle Code defines an 
“automated traffic law enforcement system” as “a device with one 
or more motor vehicle sensors working in conjunction with a red 
light signal to produce recorded images of motor vehicles entering 
an intersection against a red signal indication in violation of 
Section 11-306 of this Code or a similar provision of a local 
ordinance.”36  The Code then recognizes local schemes may 
originate in a “county or municipality including a home rule 
county or municipality.”37  It further recognizes, however, that the 
“regulation of the use of automated traffic law enforcement 
systems to record vehicle speeds is an exclusive power and 
33. See, e.g., People ex rel. Ryan v. Village of Hanover Park, 724 N.E.2d 132, 138–143 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (villages’ alternative traffic programs (aimed at speeders) disrupt the 
uniform enforcement of chapter 11 of the Vehicle Code because they eliminate trial court 
hearings and the records of traffic offenses being sent to the Secretary of State). 
34. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-6-7a(b) (West 2010) (“No police officer may utilize 
a traffic law photo-monitoring device to determine compliance with, or to detect a violation of, 
a municipal or county ordinance or any provision of this code that governs or regulates the 
operation of motor vehicles.”). 
35. E.g., “Any incorporated municipality may by ordinance adopt, by reference, any [of 
certain Code sections on traffic control] and may by ordinance provide additional regulations 
for the operation of vehicles within the municipality, which shall not be in conflict with the 
provisions of the listed sections.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-307 (West 2010), which was 
employed in City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 334–35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
36. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-208.6(a) (West 2010). 
37. Id.  Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-300.1(c), (d) (West 2010) (authorizing only 
certain named local governments). 
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function of the State.”38
The Illinois Vehicle Code also sets standards for local 
automated traffic enforcement systems directed at red light runners 
and stop sign violators, among others.  These standards include 
mandates on written notice of alleged violations to vehicle 
owners;39 confidentiality of recorded images;40 the manner of 
proving the defense of vehicle theft;41 limits on civil penalties;42 
and notices to motorists regarding the placements of motor vehicle 
sensors at intersections.43
State government preemption can vary interstate.  While 
recording vehicle speeds “is an exclusive power and function” of 
Illinois state government,44 local speeding regulations based on 
automated systems are permitted elsewhere.  In Cleveland, the 
Parking Violations Bureau hears appeals by owners of speeding 
vehicles.45  Where all state governments confront budgetary woes, 
the cash cows born of red light enforcement schemes seem to me 
especially susceptible to intrastate political battles over control, 
particularly in such matters as speeding and other moving vehicle 
violations where both state and local powers have often been 
concurrently exercised.46
The Knoxville “red light enforcement program” was 
challenged on state preemption grounds, with the defendant urging 
the code provision “imposes a criminal fine,” not a civil fine, and 
38. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-208.6(c) (West 2010).  Other state laws 
authorizing automated traffic enforcement schemes are briefly mentioned in City of Davenport 
v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Iowa 2008) (“most states . . . have no legislation”). 
39. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-208.6(d) (West 2010). 
40. Id. 5/11-208.6(g). 
41. Id. 5/11-208.6(i). 
42. Id. 5/11-208.6(j).  Compare, e.g., City of De Kalb v. White, 591 N.E.2d 522, 524 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (no “statutory proscription of a minimum fine” for speeders prosecuted 
under ordinances). 
43. Ch. 625 § 5/11-208.6(k). 
44. Id. 5/11-208.6(c). 
45. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(k) (FindLaw through June 30, 2010).  
The constitutionality of the Cleveland procedures was sustained in Balaban v. City of 
Cleveland, No. 1:07-cv-1366, 2010 WL 481283, at *7–8 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2010). 
46. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger, supra note 6 (“California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger 
figures the cash-strapped and deeply indebted state could pick up another $338 million through 
June, 2011, by using speed sensors in red-light cameras at 500 intersections to nab speeders . . 
. .”).  State action is easily undertaken at so-called EZ Pass sites on major tollways (where 
perhaps speeding as well as toll payment failures could be addressed by charging vehicle 
owner credit cards already on file in order to keep EZ Pass devices operative). 
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thus is “an ultra vires act”―an act outside of local governmental 
powers.47  A Tennessee appeals court rejected the challenge in 
2008, finding that while the city program “triggered” certain 
“constitutional protections” that attend proceedings aimed at 
punishment and deterrence, the challenged red light enforcements 
were “civil in nature . . . well within the police power of the City of 
Knoxville.”48
B.  Federal Constitutional Interests 
Beside state law preemption, the Knoxville, Chicago, and 
Cleveland automated traffic enforcement schemes have all been 
challenged on varying federal constitutional grounds.  The rulings 
are now briefly reviewed.49
1.  Equal Protection 
The Chicago scheme was challenged in federal court on equal 
protection grounds because “it distinguishes between car 
dealerships and manufacturers on the one hand and all other car 
owners on the other.”50  Only dealers and manufacturers escaped 
liability for violations involving their vehicles by proving their 
vehicles were leased.  As no suspect class or fundamental right was 
alleged, the district court employed the rational basis test, which 
allows any sound reason to validate a challenged law.51  The 
reason given here was that dealers and manufacturers, but not other 
owners, “‘turned over regular, active possession and use’” of their 
cars, thus having no “‘day-to-day control over who drives.’”52  
47. City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
48. Id. at 338.  A review of the differing forms of state preemption of local automated 
traffic enforcement schemes is found in City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 538–
39 (Iowa 2008) (express preemption and implied preemption—which can be based on either 
“obvious, unavoidable” conflict with state law or “persuasive concrete evidence of an intent to 
preempt the field” by state lawmakers) and Mendenhall v. City of Akron, 881 N.E.2d 255, 260 
(Ohio 2008) (analysis includes consideration of police versus local self-government powers, 
special versus general statutes and whether there is conflict between state and local laws 
involving the same misconduct). 
49. Constitutional challenges to local red light enforcement schemes have also failed 
elsewhere.  See, e.g., Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D. N.C. 2003); 
Kilper v. City of Arnold, No. 4:08cv0267 TCM, 2009 WL 2208404 (E.D. Mo. 2009). 
50. Idris I, 06 C 6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008), aff’d, Idris II, 
552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009). 
51. Id. at *4. 
52. Id. 
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That reason was sufficient even if the lawmakers had no 
“legitimate purpose in mind” when they acted, as “‘retrospective 
logic’” can justify a law challenged under the rational basis test.53  
The appeals court also found no inappropriate inequality, as a 
legitimate goal “is to impose the fine on the person who . . . is in 
charge of the car.”54
The Chicago scheme has also been challenged on equal 
protection grounds because the central business loop 
area/downtown is “‘exclusively segregated from these lights being 
equally and proportionately placed, as they are in other parts of the 
city,’”55 thus distinguishing drivers by where they drive.  This 
challenge was also rejected in federal court as there is “no 
identifiable group of people who drive exclusively in the 
downtown areas” and no “separate and distinct group whose 
driving is limited to the outskirts.”56  As well, the Chicago scheme 
was deemed rational in that it may well be the “high priority 
intersections are not located in the downtown area” and that local 
officials were looking “to get the most ‘bang for their buck’ by 
concentrating on the most notable lawbreakers.”57  The Court 
found rational basis review was appropriate because no suspect 
class was targeted or fundamental right addressed by the 
ordinance.  However, the Court left the door open to application of 
stricter review by noting that in this case there was no suggestion 
that “the red light cameras . . . were placed in certain 
neighborhoods with a distinct racial character or areas heavily 
populated with individuals of similar national origin.”58
2.   Excessive Fines 
The Cleveland scheme was challenged in federal court under 
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the 
federal Constitution.59  The challenge was rejected as the court 
deemed the penalties were “proportional” to the offenses, with 
53. Id. at *5 (statute passes rational basis test even if revenue production was the goal). 
54. Idris II, 552 F.3d at 567. 
55. Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
56. Id. at 3. 
57. Id. at 4. 
58. Id. at *4 n.4 (citing Cruz v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 1999 WL 560989, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 
July 28, 1999).  See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 230 (1976) (equality principles 
may not be violated even if the law has “a racial disproportionate impact”). 
59. Gardner v. City of Cleveland, 656 F. Supp. 2d 751, 763 (N.D. Ohio 2009). 
WLR_47-2 PARNESS 2/12/2011  2:48:06 PM 
2011] RED LIGHT ENFORCEMENT 269 
 
increased fines for more significant speeding.60
3.   Substantive Due Process 
Both the Chicago and Cleveland ordinances were challenged 
on federal constitutional substantive due process grounds.  In both 
cases, no fundamental rights (and no suspect classes) were 
involved;61 therefore the schemes were sustained as they were 
found to be rational.  The Cleveland ordinance was deemed 
“rationally related to the City’s goal of improving traffic safety.”62  
The Chicago ordinance was deemed to improve compliance with 
traffic laws and could not be called “unconstitutionally 
whimsical.”63  While $90, $100, or $200 dollar fines did not 
implicate federal constitutional property interests demanding more 
than rational government actions, the reviewing courts offered 
little guidance on when fines would be large enough, and thus 
more than modest,64 so as to prompt less deferential judicial 
review.  One federal district judge opined “fines and fees of over 
$500 on car owners” who had no “innocent-owner defense” would 
be sustained on appeal if rational.65
4.  Procedural Due Process 
Federal constitutional procedural due process challengers 
must demonstrate that either before or after fines are levied and 
perhaps paid, violators are not afforded adequate processes to 
contest.66  In a challenge to the Cleveland ordinance, a federal 
60. Id. (employing the proportionality test of United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 
334 (1998)).  See also Balaban v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:07-cv-1366, 2010 WL 481283, at 
*5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2010) (fine of $100 or $200 not an excessive penalty); Towers v. City of 
Chi., 173 F.3d 619, 623–26 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting excessive fines challenge to ordinance 
violations with $500 fines); State v. Forfeiture of: 2003 Chevrolet Pickup, Blue in Color, MT. 
License AFH-845 VIN/2GCEK19N731269822, 202 P.3d 782, 783 (Mont. 2009) (the federal 
constitutional excessive fines provision has not yet been applied to the states by the U.S. 
Supreme Court). CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(o) (FindLaw through June 30, 
2010) outlines the penalties for violations of the red-light enforcement scheme. 
61. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 761; Idris II, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009). 
62. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 762. 
63. Idris II, 552 F.3d at 566. 
64. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 763; Idris II, 552 F.3d at 566 (the property interest in a 
$90 fine is “modest”). 
65. Idris I, 2008 WL 182248, at *7 (quoting Towers v. City of Chi., 173 F.3d 619, 626 
(7th Cir. 1999)). 
66.  
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district court found adequate pre-deprivation processes.67  Pre-
deprivation process rights included “notice, a hearing and an 
opportunity to present evidence.”68  Post-deprivation process rights 
included appeals to a local trial court of adverse hearing examiner 
findings.69  Similarly, the Chicago ordinance was sustained in the 
federal courts upon procedural due process challenges.  The district 
court sanctioned procedures including: the “use of hearsay 
evidence (i.e., the photographs captured by the automated 
cameras);” the withholding by the City of exculpatory evidence at 
initial hearings; the unavailability of an opportunity to cross 
examine the custodian of the photographs; the lack of juries; and 
the use of evidence inadmissible in criminal proceedings.70  The 
appellate court concluded: 
It is enough to say that photographs are at least as reliable as 
live testimony, that the due process clause allows administrative 
decisions to be made on paper (or photographic) records without 
regard to the hearsay rule . . . and that the procedures Chicago uses 
are functionally identical to those it uses to adjudicate parking 
tickets.71
C.  State Constitutional Interests 
Beyond preemption and federal constitutional interests, local 
automated traffic enforcement schemes have been challenged on 
state constitutional grounds.  Such challenges have been founded 
on state provisions that appear comparable to federal constitutional 
provisions, but nevertheless could be read to provide greater 
protections.  They have also been founded on state provisions that 
expressly provide greater protections than are available federally. 
1. Comparable, But Enhanced, Protections 
In a federal case challenging the Chicago automated traffic 
enforcement scheme, the trial judge correctly recognized that 
comparably worded federal and state constitutional rights can be 
67. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 759. 
68. Id. at 759. (citing CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(k) (FindLaw 
through June 30, 2010)). 
69. Gardner, 2009 WL 2591621, at 5 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2506 (LexisNexis 
2010)). 
70. Idris I, 2008 WL 182248, at *8–9. 
71. Idris II, 552 F.3d 564, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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applied quite differently, with the state provision creating 
“broader” protections.72  Of course, narrower state protections are 
barred by federal constitutional Supremacy Clause principles. 
A variety of approaches can be taken when considering 
whether to extend broader rights under comparable state 
constitutions.  In one case, a state high court employed “six 
nonexclusive neutral criteria” which included the language in the 
state constitution and its differences with the federal constitutional 
text; the state history; preexisting state law; structural differences 
in federal and state constitutions; and matters of particular local 
concern.73  In another case, a different state high court declared 
that its role is to provide “the first line of defense for individual 
liberties,” that may veer from U.S. Supreme Court precedents that 
retrench on Bill of Rights issues or fail to “adequately protect . . . 
basic rights and liberties.”74
2.  Broader Protections 
Beyond interests comparable to federal constitutional 
interests, explicit state constitutional interests, independent of and 
different from federal constitutional interests, are occasionally 
available to invalidate local automated traffic enforcement 
schemes.  For example, the fifty-dollar penalty within the 
Knoxville City Code for running a red light was recognized as 
implicating the Tennessee constitutional provision declaring “no 
fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty 
dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers.”75  This 
provision was said by one court to apply to all fines, whether 
deemed civil or criminal in nature by legislators.76  However, in 
the challenged Knoxville law establishing the red-light 
enforcement scheme, the constitutional provision was inapplicable 
because the fine was not more than fifty dollars.77  The court 
hinted the provision would apply if the fine was over fifty dollars 
72. Idris I, 2008 WL 182248, at *8 (recognizing broader Illinois constitutional 
procedural due process protections). 
73. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812–13 (Wash. 1986). 
74. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn. 2005). 
75. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 14; City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 338 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
76. City of Knoxville, 284 S.W.3d at 337 (quoting Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 
261–62 (Tenn. 2001)). 
77. Id. at 338. 
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and its primary legislative purpose was punitive rather than 
remedial or if the fine, though legislatively intended to be 
remedial, was nevertheless “so punitive in its actual purpose or 
effect that it cannot legitimately be viewed as remedial in 
nature.”78  Thus, Knoxville seemingly could not implement 
schemes like those in Chicago or Cleveland due to its unique 
constitutional provisions on juries. 
At times, explicit and independent state constitutional 
interests involve privacy.  In Chicago and elsewhere in Illinois, 
local traffic regulations must respect the Illinois constitutional 
provision declaring: “The people shall have the right to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against 
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or 
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or 
other means.”79  By contrast, the comparable federal constitutional 
provision speaks to only “unreasonable searches and seizures” of 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . .”80
IV.  POSSIBLE NEW REGULATIONS OF SECONDARY CULPRITS 
The automated traffic enforcement schemes in Knoxville, 
Chicago, and Cleveland demonstrate that secondary culprits can be 
held financially accountable by local governments in civil 
proceedings81 for misconduct involving their cars that is primarily 
undertaken by others.  New local regulations directed at property 
owners could be expanded under the supporting judicial decisions 
not only to other acts involving cars, but also to other matters 
traditionally subject to local authority, including trash, tobacco, 
alcohol, and illegal drugs. 
A.  Adequate Control and Enforcement 
In assessing possible expansions, one key guideline not yet 
well-defined involves the degree of property owner “control” 
78. Id. at 338 (quoting Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 264). 
79. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
81. Under Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), courts have found that penalties 
against property owners arise in civil rather than criminal proceedings.  Therefore, there are 
different process rights that attend criminal cases.  See, e.g., Balaban v. City of Cleveland, No. 
1:07-cv-1366, 2010 WL 481283, at *3–6 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2010); Shavitz v. City of 
Highpoint, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702, 712–17 (M.D. N.C. 2008). 
WLR_47-2 PARNESS 2/12/2011  2:48:06 PM 
2011] RED LIGHT ENFORCEMENT 273 
 
needed to rationalize regulations of property owners as secondary 
culprits because they failed to oversee adequately the primary 
culprits who misused the property.  In Chicago, though not in 
Knoxville or Cleveland,82 car owners cannot shift automated traffic 
enforcement liabilities onto named primary culprits.83  Ownership 
alone is a form of control that can satisfy due process. 
The required control was found by a federal district court in 
the Chicago automated traffic scheme because car owners are able 
to “restrict . . . the use of their cars “ having “‘sole authority’ to 
‘set the restrictions.’”84  The trial judge further observed, however, 
that “a tenuous relationship” between a property owner and a 
wrongdoer could not lead to owner liability.85  The federal appeals 
court elaborated, observing that threats of penalty on property 
owners prompt them to “choose” their property users “more 
carefully” and to increase their “vigilance.”86  It noted that car 
owners subject to the Chicago automated enforcement scheme 
were like others subject to no-fault penalties, including a taxpayer 
responsible for an attorney’s or accountant’s errors;87 a tenant 
responsible for “a guest’s misbehavior”88 and a car owner 
responsible for a driver’s use of the car in “committing a crime.”89  
The appellate court also observed that even where reasonable 
82. Compare CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-040, with KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. V, div. 1, § 17-210(c)(4), and CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE § 
413.031(k) (FindLaw through June 30, 2010). 
83. In Chicago and elsewhere in Illinois, initial criminal, rather than civil or 
administrative, responsibilities of car owners seemingly cannot usually be founded on laws 
holding owners absolutely liable for misuse of their cars.  See, e.g., People v. Carpenter, 888 
N.E.2d 105, 119 (Ill. 2008) (under due process, criminal statutes typically must hold 
accountable only those engaged in “‘knowing’ conduct in furtherance of a clearly culpable 
objective”; thus a car owner could not be criminally prosecuted simply because the owner 
knew the car contained a “false or secret compartment[]”). 
84. Idris I, 2008 WL 182248, at *7 (quoting Towers v. City of Chi., 173 F.3d 619, 627 
(7th Cir. 1999)). 
85. Id. (citing Town of Normal v. Seven Kegs, 599 N.E.2d 1384, 1389 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992)) (beer distributor not liable for kegs that were misused by consumers who had received 
the kegs from a beer retailer). 
86. Idris II, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009). 
87. Id. (citing United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 252 (1985)). 
88. Id.(citing Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002)). 
89. Id. (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 444–46 (1996).  At times, by statute, 
car owners may not be responsible for a driver’s use.  See, e.g., People v. 1991 Dodge Ram 
Charger, 620 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ill. App. 2d 1993) (only one co-owner found liable in car 
forfeiture proceeding involving illegal drug sales by non-owner, because only one co-owner 
engaged in statutory “conduct”). 
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control failed, or was not exercised, car owners paying automated 
traffic enforcement fines “can pass the expense on to the real 
wrongdoer.”90
The appellate court’s rationale showed that property owners 
as secondary culprits are not limited to vehicles and automated 
enforcement schemes.  In fact, the same appeals court had a few 
years earlier sustained two Chicago Municipal Code ordinances 
making vehicle owners absolutely responsible for up to five 
hundred dollars in fines when illegal drugs or firearms were found 
by law enforcement officers in the owners’ vehicles.91  In that 
same case, the court reasoned the owners were culpable in that 
“they must have given some degree of consent to the use of their 
cars.”92
What remains unclear are the circumstances under which the 
owners’ “degree of consent to the use of their cars” is so marginal 
as to constitute tenuous relationships with the car users.93  Are all 
parents, spouses, significant others, roommates and friends who 
lend their cars in sufficient “control”?  What about separated 
90. Idris II, 552 F.3d at 566. 
91. Towers v. City of Chi., 173 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1999) (sustaining CHI., ILL. 
MUN. CODE §§ 7-24-225 (drugs) & 8-20-015 (firearms) (Am. Legal Publ’g Corp. through 
Council Journal 2010)).  Sections 8-8-060 (prostitution), 8-16-020 (children on streets at 
night), and 11-4-1115 (sound devices) of the Chicago Municipal Code, which also impose a 
fine for particular misuses of a vehicle, were also challenged by plaintiffs, as secondary 
culprits.  Towers, 173 F.3d at 621 n.1. 
Today, vehicle owners remain responsible “for an administrative penalty of $1,000.00 plus any 
applicable towing and storage fees” for drugs. CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 7-24-225.  In addition, 
the vehicle will be subject to seizure and impoundment if used in the commission of 
prostitution.  Id. at § 8-8-060(d)(1).  A “parent or guardian of a minor commits an offense if he 
. . . by insufficient control allows . . . the minor” to violate “curfew hours.”  Id. at § 8-16-
020(b)(2).  The provision on “sound device restrictions,” Id. at § 11-4-1115, noted in Towers, 
has been repealed. 
92. Towers, 173 F.3d at 625. 
93. Id.  Similar questions regarding adequate control in non-property settings also arise.  
Consider the Parental Responsibility provision in the Municipal Code of the City of De Kalb, 
Illinois, section 52.130, which says this about the definition of “knowingly”: “This 
requirement is intended to hold a neglectful or careless parent up to a reasonable community 
standard of parental responsibility through an objective test.  It shall therefore be no defense 
that a parent was completely indifferent to the activities or conduct or whereabouts of such 
juvenile.”  DEKALB, ILL., MUN. CODE § 52.130 (2010). 
As well, similar questions regarding adequate owner control over non-car properties also arise.  
These answers might vary, for example, between movable and non-movable properties.  An 
owner’s car can be removed from the owner’s sight, but a building cannot.  The DeKalb 
Municipal Code section 12.01 on public nuisances declares responsibilities for a “person in 
possession, charge or control of any lot, building or premises.”  Id. at § 12.01. 
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spouses, or mere acquaintances, or strangers who are entrusted by 
vehicle owners at the urging of others who are not strangers?  And 
what about employers whose vehicles are allowed to be used by 
employees both on and off the clock?  Absolute owner liability in 
the absence of lease or reported theft would make proceedings 
more efficient.  Perhaps the fairness of such efficiencies should be 
left to the body politic rather than to substantive federal 
constitutional limits.94
Also unclear is the legitimacy of assessing civil penalties on 
property owners with lesser control over property users when 
penalties are not assessed on property owners with more control.  
For example, in Chicago, car owners are responsible when their 
cars are badly driven by spouses, children, or friends.  But car 
owners who are dealerships or manufacturers with written leases 
are not responsible.  Arguably, in important ways such lessors have 
more control.  In sustaining the Chicago ordinance, Circuit Judge 
Easterbrook said a car owner who is not a lessor “can insist that the 
driver reimburse the outlay if he wants to use the car again (or 
maintain the friendship).”95  Often such insistence will not prompt 
reimbursement.  By contrast, lessors can demand reimbursement as 
a condition of the lease (and have credit car numbers to secure 
payments for fines, as well as payments for vehicle damage, 
arising during the lease). 
A second key guideline not yet well defined involves who can 
be designated to charge secondary culprits with local government 
violations founded on the actions of primary culprits who are under 
“some degree” of control.  In many local automated traffic 
enforcement settings, similar to the Knoxville, Chicago, and 
Cleveland schemes, local governments contract with private 
companies to provide, operate, and maintain surveillance 
equipment.96  Local governments have also been authorized 
94. In rejecting an attack on the Chicago red light camera program, one federal judge, 
citing City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., said: “When social or economic 
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the 
Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the 
democratic processes.”  Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 18, 2009) (citing City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 
440 (1985)) (citation omitted). 
95. Idris II, 552 F.3d at 566. 
96. The history of the Knoxville scheme, and the city’s contract with Redflex, a private 
Australian company, is reviewed in Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 
2008 WL 782540, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008). 
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themselves to acquire and utilize such equipment.97  There seems 
to be little controversy here. 
Property owners may also be charged as secondary culprits 
after law enforcement officers observe others misusing the 
property.  For example, since 1990, Chicago has had an 
administrative adjudication scheme for parking tickets issued not 
only by police officers, but also by “traffic control aides, other 
designated members of the police department, parking enforcement 
aides, and other persons authorized by the City’s traffic 
compliance administrator to issue parking and compliance 
violation notices.”98  There may be more controversy here if 
charging duties are moved from police and sheriff departments to 
others who are less trained and lower level officers, especially for 
violations that require judgment, discretion, and accurate 
perception.  Humans may no longer be needed to detect many 
motor vehicle violations.  But they still are required for many 
decisions regarding trash, alcohol, drugs, and other matters whose 
regulations are significantly left to local governments. 
B.  Cars 
Owners whose vehicles are misused, whether caught by 
automated schemes or law enforcement personnel, can be held 
responsible financially as secondary culprits.  Owners may not be 
able to shift liability by naming the primary culprits.  Financial 
penalties typically are fines, as in Knoxville, Chicago, and 
Cleveland.  Fines prompt in personam proceedings because the 
fines can be satisfied with any property.  Penalties can also involve 
monetary losses through forfeitures, as when vehicles are seized 
and sold for public benefit after use during a crime.99  Forfeitures 
97. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-110.5(5) (2010) (limiting methods by which the 
state and local governments using automated traffic enforcement schemes may contract with 
vendors and manufacturers of automated vehicle identification systems for use or purchase of 
equipment). 
98. Van Harken v. City of Chi., 713 N.E.2d 754, 757 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (citing 
CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE 9-100-030, 040 (1998)). 
99. See, e.g., Towers v. City of Chi., 173 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1999).  In Towers, the 
Court said the following regarding a motor vehicle regulatory scheme: 
[W]e agree . . . that any distinction between in rem forfeitures (which proceed against the 
offending property) and in personam fines (which proceed against the owner) is one of form, 
but not substance.  Both proceedings result in an economic penalty to the owner because his 
property was used improperly; both serve the same governmental purpose of deterring 
unlawful conduct.  There is only one functional difference between an in rem forfeiture 
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became more attractive to governments in 1996, after the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Bennis v. Michigan sustained a Michigan civil 
forfeiture law over the objections of a secondary culprit, a woman 
whose husband engaged in an illegal sexual act in the family car 
which the woman jointly owned with her husband.100
Beyond automated traffic enforcement, Chicago imposes fines 
on the owners of vehicles used during bad acts by others.101  The 
police fined Robert Sturdivant five hundred dollars in 1996 
because they “witnessed a person in possession of an unregistered 
handgun run and jump into Robert Sturdivant’s car.”102  At his 
final hearing,103 Robert could not “assert an innocent-owner 
defense because the ordinance does not recognize such a 
defense.”104
The final hearing may have been more complicated had 
Robert Sturdivant’s car been subject to forfeiture for its misuse by 
another.  In Bennis, in rejecting a federal constitutional Due 
Process and Takings Clause challenge, the U.S. Supreme Court 
sustained a car forfeiture.  However, the Court found it important 
that a Michigan forfeiture court, acting against a vehicle owned by 
a husband and wife after the husband was caught in the vehicle 
with a prostitute, had remedial discretion regarding the total loss of 
the vehicle to the wife.105  The Court explicitly noted that the 
Michigan trial judge considered discretionary authority under 
Michigan case law, including an ability to order a portion of the 
sale proceeds, less costs, be paid to an “‘innocent co-title 
holder.’”106  Justice Ginsburg observed in her concurrence that 
proceeding and the in personam fines at issue in this case: The in rem forfeiture proceeding 
results in varying economic consequences from defendant to defendant, based on the value of 
the property; the in personam fine results in a fixed economic penalty. 
Id. at 626–27. 
100. 516 U.S. 442, 443–44 (1996). 
101. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 7-24-226 (2010). 
102. Towers, 173 F.3d at 622. 
103. Robert never received notice of his right to a preliminary hearing.  Id.  He “was 
without his vehicle for more than fifteen days before he was able to pay to have the car 
released to him.”  Id. 
104. Id.  The court noted that Robert was more culpable than the plaintiff in Bennis, who 
had ownership rights with her spouse who used the car to procure a prostitute.  Robert’s 
culpability was distinguished because he had “sole authority to decide to whom” to lend his 
car and “to set the restrictions and checks that were appropriate to ensure that the vehicle 
would not be used to support illegal conduct.”  Id. at 627. 
105. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453. 
106. Id. at 444–45 (the trial judge declined to exercise this discretion for plaintiff as the 
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such discretion was important to prevent “exorbitant applications” 
of forfeiture statutes.107  Ordinances setting fixed non-excessive 
fines,108 rather than forfeitures, for secondary culprits remove “the 
potential for drastically, or exorbitantly, harsh penalties on an 
innocent owner.”109  Forfeitures rather than―or in addition 
to―fines are seemingly more appropriate when the misused 
property, though not illegal, has little or no significant value 
outside of illegal conduct.110
Beyond unregistered handguns and prostitution, other non-
driving bad acts occurring in or with cars can expose car owners to 
strict liabilities for fines, if not forfeitures.  In the class action  case 
sustaining the fine on Robert Sturdivant, the federal appeals court 
noted that Chicago had vehicle-related ordinances regarding illegal 
drugs, children on streets at night, and sound devices.111
A few Chicago ordinances seemingly penalize car owners for 
the bad vehicle acts of others without any express indication of the 
need for some significant degree of owner control.  One ordinance 
says: 
(a) No person shall drive or be in actual physical control of any 
vehicle within the City of Chicago while under the influence of 
couple owned another car, so she would not be left “without transportation,” and the sale 
proceeds would amount to “practically nothing” after costs, as the car was eleven years old and 
recently bought for $600).  Such discretion can also be guided by statute.  See, e.g., 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/36-1 (West 2010) (a spouse of a vehicle owner whose vehicle is seized for 
certain Vehicle Code violations can seek vehicle forfeiture to himself or herself or some family 
member by “showing that the seized vehicle is the only source of transportation” and 
“financial hardship to the family . . . outweighs the benefit to the State from the seizure . . .”). 
107. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 457 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
108. See Browning-Ferris Industr. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 
(1989) (not reaching issue of applicability of Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause to 
states through Fourteenth Amendment).  But see, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“All penalties 
shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of 
restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”) and People v. One 2000 GMC VIN 
3GNFK16T2YG169852, 829 N.E.2d 437, 439–40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (applying federal 
constitutional bar on excessive fines to a state vehicle forfeiture proceeding). 
109. Towers, 173 F.3d at 627 (viewing the discretion in forfeiture settings as “a safety 
valve” that can eliminate statutory applications that “exact from the innocent owner a 
forfeiture of property of exorbitantly high value in proportion to the owner’s responsibility”). 
110. See, e.g., Bennis, 516 U.S. at 459–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (forfeitures differ 
when the property is pure contraband, proceeds of criminal activity, or tools of the criminal’s 
trade); id. at 461 (the forfeiture of the third type of property is most “problematic,” though not 
as much when the property is principally used for an illegal purpose because “the law may 
reasonably presume that the owner . . . is aware of the principal use being made of that 
property”). 
111. Towers, 173 F.3d at 621. 
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alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating compound or 
compounds or any combination thereof . . . 
(b) Any vehicle used in a violation of subsection (a) of this 
section shall be subject to seizure and impoundment . . . .  The 
owner of record of such vehicle shall be liable to the city for an 
administrative penalty of $1,000.00 in addition to fees for the 
towing and storage of the vehicle.112
 
A second ordinance deems the “owner of record of any motor 
vehicle that is used for transportation or the solicitation for the 
transportation of passengers for hire” in violation of the Chicago 
Municipal Code is “liable to the city for an administrative penalty 
of $750.00 plus any towing and storage fees” if the vehicle is 
impounded.113
Impoundment laws sometimes create secondary culprit 
liability for vehicle owners.  Local laws often authorize 
impoundments of unattended vehicles for such purposes as 
removing cars obstructing traffic,114 removing cars in “tow away” 
zones,115 securing damaged cars,116 or recovering stolen items.117  
112. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7-24-226 (Am. Legal Publ’g Corp. through Council 
Journal 2010). 
113. Id. § 9-112-555(a). 
114. See, e.g., CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 405.02(a) (FindLaw through June 
30, 2010) (“Police officers are authorized to provide for the removal of a vehicle under the 
following circumstances: (a) When any vehicle is left unattended upon any street, alley or 
bridge and constitutes an unreasonable hazard or obstruction to the normal movement of traffic 
. . . .”); CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-92-030(b) (“Members of the police department and 
employees of the department of streets and sanitation . . . may authorize the removal of a 
vehicle from any public way . . . under the following circumstances: . . .  When an unattended 
vehicle is unlawfully parked so as to constitute a hazard or obstruction to the normal 
movement of traffic.”); KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 17, art. II, div. 4, § 17-
98(1) (Municode 2009) (“Members of the police department shall have the authority to 
impound any vehicle . . . under the following circumstances: . . .  When a vehicle is parked, 
stopped or standing upon an alley, street or highway so as to obstruct or impede the flow of 
traffic thereon or endanger the safety of the public.”). 
115. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-92-030(f) (“When an unattended vehicle is 
parked illegally in an officially designated and marked ‘tow zone’”); KNOXVILLE, TENN., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 17, art. II, div. 4, § 17-98(6) (“At any place where official signs or 
markings designate a no parking or tow away zone”). 
116. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-92-030(a) (“When a vehicle upon any public 
way is so disabled as to constitute an obstruction to traffic and the person or persons in charge 
of the vehicle are by reason of physical injury incapacitated to such an extent as to be unable to 
provide for its custody or removal”); CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 405.02(f) (“When 
any vehicle has been damaged or wrecked so as to be inoperable . . .”). 
117. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 405.02(c) (“When any vehicle has been 
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When impoundments promote safety or property return, 
assessments against registered vehicle owners are not punitive in 
nature, but rather remedial as they are related to the costs of 
impoundment.118
Additional impoundments are also authorized locally in 
Chicago and Cleveland when vehicle operators violate criminal or 
traffic laws.119  Again, fees are assessed against the owners.  Here, 
while some assessments may be described as involving cost 
recovery, certain fees seem punitive.  For example, in Chicago, 
when a vehicle operator eludes a police officer and the officer 
chooses not to pursue, the officer reports the occurrence.  There 
later can follow a notice to impound.120  The owner of the vehicle 
stolen or operated without the consent of the owner.”). 
118. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-92-080 (“The owner or other person entitled to 
possession of a vehicle lawfully impounded . . . shall pay a fee of $150.00, or $250.00 if the 
vehicle has a gross weight of 8,000 pounds or more, to cover the cost of the towing and a fee 
of $10.00 per day for the first five days and $35.00 per day thereafter, or $60.00 per day for 
the first five days and $100.00 per day thereafter if the vehicle has a gross weight of 8,000 
pounds or more, to cover the cost of storage, provided that no fees shall be assessed for any 
tow or storage with respect to a tow which has been determined to be erroneous.”); 
CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 405.04 (“Whenever any vehicle, except a bicycle, is 
stored in a vehicle pound for any reason, the person reclaiming the vehicle shall be charged a 
storage fee of nine dollars ($9.00) for the first five days or fraction thereof, and thereafter shall 
be charged six dollars ($6.00) for each day or fraction of a day.”); id. at § 405.06(a) (“In 
addition to the storage fee provided for in Section 405.04, the following fees shall be assessed 
against the owner or other person claiming an impounded vehicle: (1) An impound fee of 
thirty dollars ($30.00), except that the impound fee shall be reduced to ten ($10.00) dollars for 
a person reclaiming a recovered stolen vehicle. (2) A towing fee of ninety dollars ($90.00), 
except that the towing fee shall be reduced to fifty dollars ($50.00) for a person reclaiming a 
recovered stolen vehicle, and shall be increased to one hundred and twenty-five dollars 
($125.00) for a person reclaiming a vehicle impounded incident to an arrest. The towing 
charge shall be increased by ten dollars ($10.00) if a dolly or flatbed is used or if a tire or tires 
are changed.”); KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 17, art. II, div. 4, §17-
100(a),(b) (“(a) To offset the cost of impoundment, including the cost of maintaining the 
vehicle pound, all motor vehicles impounded . . . shall be subject to a fee of twenty dollars 
($20.00) plus the city’s actual cost for towing. (b) After the first seventy-two (72) hours, a 
daily storage fee of eight dollars ($8.00) per twenty-four-hour day shall be imposed.”). 
119. See, e.g., CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 405.02(e) (“When any vehicle has 
been used in or connected with the commission of procuring, soliciting, prostitution, soliciting 
drug sales . . . or any felony.”); id. § 405.02(i) (“When any vehicle has been operated by any 
person who is driving without a lawful license or while his license has been suspended or 
revoked.”); CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 9-92-030(g) (“When a vehicle is in violation of any 
provision of the traffic code authorizing towing and impoundment for that violation”); id. § 9-
92-030(h) (“When a vehicle is subject to towing or removal under the Illinois Vehicle Code, 
the Criminal Code of 1961, or any other law”); id.§ 9-92-030(i) (“When towing or removal is 
necessary as an incident to arrest”). 
120. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-92-035(b) & (d). 
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used to elude “shall be subject to an administrative penalty of 
$1,000.00 plus the cost of towing and storage of the vehicle.”121  
Another Chicago ordinance states: 
The owner of record of any motor vehicle that contains any 
controlled substance or cannabis, as defined in the Controlled 
Substances Act and the Cannabis Control Act or that is used in the 
purchase, attempt to purchase, sale or attempt to sell such 
controlled substances or cannabis shall be liable to the city for an 
administrative penalty of $1,000.00 plus any applicable towing and 
storage fees.  Any such vehicles shall be subject to seizure and 
impoundment pursuant to this section.122
In Cleveland, when a vehicle is towed incident to an arrest of 
the driver, the standard towing fee of $90.00 is increased to 
$125.00.123  The $35.00 differential seems punitive as to an 
innocent owner who was uninvolved personally in the acts leading 
to arrest. 
C.  Trash 
Trash, like cars, is subject to significant local government 
regulation.  And like innocent owners of cars, innocent owners of 
other property that is misused can be held financially responsible 
for the bad acts of the those who trash the property and over whom 
they exercise “some” control.  Landlords arguably have significant 
authority over their tenants.  So do private homeowners or co-
owners over spouses, children, or others with whom they live, as 
well as over guests.  Fines can be levied though the old jalopy was 
not created directly by the property owner of the land where it sits.  
Short-term immunities, or opportunities to rectify upon notice, 
would serve to remove what the earlier-noted court described as 
“the potential for drastically, or exorbitantly, harsh penalties on an 
innocent owner.”124  Remedial discretion is not limited to post-
charge hearings in forfeiture proceedings; it can be employed 
during pre-charge deliberations.  Yet any such immunities or 
chances to rectify seemingly need not be afforded under the due 
process precedents. 
In Chicago, largely innocent property owners seemingly can 
121. Id. § 9-92-035(g). 
122. Id. § 7-24-225 (citations omitted). 
123. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE 405.06(a)(2). 
124. Towers v. City of Chi., 173 F.3d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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be fined for trash caused by others, as long as the owners had some 
degree of control over those who trashed the property, even where 
it is difficult to demonstrate lack of control.  One ordinance says: 
 
(a) No person shall deposit refuse in a standard or commercial 
refuse container, or compactor, in a manner that prevents 
complete closure of the container’s cover, or deposit refuse on 
top of a container in a manner that interferes with opening of 
the container, or pile or stack refuse against a container. 
(b) The owner, his agent or occupant of a property shall not 
allow any person to violate subsection (a) of this section.  The 
presence of refuse preventing complete closure of the 
container’s cover, deposited on or piled or stacked against a 
standard refuse container, a commercial refuse container, or 
compactor shall be prima facie evidence of violation of this 
subsection (b). 
(c) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall 
be fined not less than $200.00 and not more than $500.00 for 
each offense.125
 
Similarly, in Knoxville an ordinance declares: 
 
If the throwing, dumping or depositing of litter is done from a 
motor vehicle, it shall be prima facie evidence that the 
throwing, dumping or depositing was done by the driver of the 
motor vehicle, or if the license plate registration number is 
known, the registered owner thereof.126
 
As in Chicago, there is little guidance on the grounds under 
which innocent property owners can rebut the prima facie evidence 
against them.  Given that the resulting fines would be small, thus 
prompting only minimal due process notice and hearing rights, 
even owners who could rebut will often be discouraged by not only 
the uncertainties, but also the costs.  In Cleveland, it is a “minor 
misdemeanor” for a motor vehicle operator to “allow litter to be 
thrown” from the vehicle except into a receptacle.127
125. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 7-28-261.  Incidentally, it appears that there is another 
instance of remedial discretion that serves to remove potentially harsh penalties on innocent 
property owners. 
126. KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 13, art. VI, § 13-194. 
127. CLEVELAND, OHIO, OFFENSES AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES CODE § 613.06(b) & 
WLR_47-2 PARNESS 2/12/2011  2:48:06 PM 
2011] RED LIGHT ENFORCEMENT 283 
 
Beyond fines, nuisance abatements involving trash can be 
directed against largely innocent property owners.  For example, in 
Cleveland: 
The owner, occupant or person in charge of any property 
within the City shall maintain such property free from any 
accumulation of garbage, rubbish, refuse or other waste which is 
not confined in approved receptacles for collection or so as to 
prevent rodent infestation.  The permitting of any premises within 
the City to be littered with garbage, rubbish, refuse or other waste 
is hereby declared to be a nuisance and unlawful.128
Such a nuisance can be abated by city officials, with “the 
costs and expenses thereof . . . to be assessed against the property 
and thereby made a lien upon it and collected as other taxes.”129
D.  Alcohol, Tobacco, and Drugs 
Alcohol, tobacco, and drugs, like trash, can be misused on or 
in property, including cars, homes, and businesses.  To the extent 
property owners have control over others who use illegal 
substances or abuse legal substances in or on their property, 
financial penalties or other consequences for owners might follow 
though the owners themselves did not participate directly in the use 
or abuse.  In Cleveland, an ordinance declares: 
No person, being the owner, lessee, occupant, or having 
custody, control or supervision of premises, or real estate . . . shall 
recklessly permit the premises to be used for the commission of a 
drug trafficking offense . . . after receipt of written notice from a 
law enforcement officer that a drug trafficking offense . . . has 
previously occurred on the premises, or real estate.130
It is “prima facie evidence that the owner or lessee” did not 
“recklessly permit” if the owner or lessee “has begun the process 
of evicting” the primary culprit(s) or “has identified for the 
police[,]. . . after receipt of notice[,]” the steps taken to “prevent 
commission of additional drug trafficking offenses on the 
premises.”131  As well, an “owner or lessor who has filed an action 
for forcible entry and detainer to remove a lessee or occupant from 
613.99 (FindLaw through June 30, 2010). 
128. Id. § 203.07. 
129. Id. § 203.03. 
130. Id. § 607.05(c). 
131. Id. § 607.05(c), (c)(1) & (2). 
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the premises” is not liable.132  In the absence of any of the express 
defenses, seemingly, there is much leeway in defining “control or 
supervision” as well as reckless permission.  Those found guilty of 
violating this ordinance have committed “a misdemeanor of the 
first degree.”133
Real property owners in Cleveland are far less innocent than 
car owners prosecuted under the Cleveland red light program, as 
they must have received notice of an earlier offense and have 
thereafter acted recklessly in permitting a new offense.134  It is 
reasonable for Cleveland lawmakers to believe car owners are 
better able to control their cars than occupants/home owners/rental 
property owners are able to control their premises.135  These 
lawmakers could also reasonably determine there is more user 
privacy in the buildings than in the cars owned by others.  Another 
Cleveland ordinance reflects a recognition of diminished control 
by premises owners as it declares that “a landlord shall give a 
tenant reasonable notice of his intent to enter the leased premises 
and enter only at reasonable times,” where twenty four hours is 
“presumed to be reasonable notice.”136 
Business owners possessing certain licenses or permits 
regarding alcohol sales can also be subject to greater liability for 
the actions of others in the owners’ establishments.  In 
Knoxville―within the ordinances on beer permit holders―a 
permittee is subject to permit revocation or suspension when the 
permittee allows any person to appear in the establishment or on 
the premises to: 
 
(1)Publicly or openly perform acts or simulated acts of sexual 
intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, 
flagellation or any other sexual acts prohibited by law; 
(2)Public or openly engage in the actual or simulated touching, 
132. Id. § 607.05(c). 
133. Id. § 607.05(f). 
134.  
135. While occupants of a premise may not be liable for fines arising from first time 
illegal drug trafficking by others, they may be subject to eviction because they permitted such 
first time offenses.  See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/11(a) (West 2010) (if lessee or 
occupant, on one occasion, permits unlawful drug trafficking in leased premises, the lease may 
be voided by the lessor). 
136. CLEVELAND, OHIO, MUN. CODE § 375.06(a).  In Chicago, a landlord usually must 
give notice of entry two days in advance. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 5-12-050 (Am. Legal 
Publ’g Corp. through Council Journal July 2, 2010). 
WLR_47-2 PARNESS 2/12/2011  2:48:06 PM 
2011] RED LIGHT ENFORCEMENT 285 
 
caressing, or fondling of the breasts, buttocks, anus or genitals; 
(3)Publicly or openly engage in the actual or simulated 
displaying of the pubic hair, anus, buttocks, vulva, genitals, or 
breasts below the top of the areola of any person; 
(4)Publicly or openly wear or use any device or covering 
exposed to public view which simulates the human breasts, 
genitals, anus, pubic hair, or any portion thereof.137
 
In addition, a beer permit holder in Knoxville can be fined on 
a “per-offense” basis for “making or permitting to be made any 
sales to underaged persons.”138  Here, owner culpability seems less 
than required in the Cleveland provision noted above where 
reckless permission was required. 
As with car owners, certain business owners involved in 
alcohol, tobacco, or drugs can be penalized for the bad acts of 
others without any apparent need for direct and personal 
involvement.  No permission is necessary.  A Chicago ordinance 
declares that it is illegal for any person to “sell, give away, barter, 
exchange or otherwise furnish any tobacco products, tobacco 
product samples and/or tobacco accessories to any individual who 
is under 18 years of age.”139  Upon violation, the person licensed to 
sell tobacco is subject to civil penalties, even if an employee 
committed the violation.140
 V.  CONCLUSION 
Local automated traffic enforcement schemes as well as local 
ticket writers are increasingly targeting property owners as 
secondary culprits.  Here, responsibilities often arise for owners 
out of their failures to control others who misuse the properties.  At 
times, property owners are absolutely responsible for the misuse of 
their property even without control failures.  Property owners are 
punished when others misuse cars, trash neighborhoods, abuse 
liquor or abuse drugs.  Commercial property owners without 
137. KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES  ch. 4, art. II, div. 2, § 4-74. 
138. Id. § 4-75(1). 
139. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-64-190. 
140. Id. § 4-64-331 (“Every act or omission which constitutes an underage tobacco 
violation by an officer, director, manager or other agent or employee of any person licensed 
pursuant to this chapter shall be deemed to be the act of such licensee and such licensee shall 
be liable for all penalties and sanctions provided by this section in the same manner as if such 
act or omission had been done or omitted by the licensee personally.”). 
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significant personal misconduct can be punished for conduct 
involving tobacco or adult entertainment on their premises.  
Secondary culprits are punished most often by fine.  At times, they 
are subject to property forfeitures.  Federal and state constitutional 
objections have largely failed to stem the surge in local laws 
punishing innocent property owners, as have state preemption 
arguments.  Secondary culprits are especially easy targets for local 
regulators seeking new revenue sources, (perhaps) as well as safer 
and cleaner communities. 
 
